The purpose of the research reported in the paper is to justify the thesis that democratic political competition leads to a better political control only under certain conditions – the voters’ competence, responsibility of political elite, high legal and political culture, etc. Methodologically the paper is presented in the form of politological and axiological discussion to the theory of Schumpeter democracy based on a comparative analysis of the causes of political competition in modern political history of democracy, in accordance with the procedural version, developed by J. Schumpeter. The output is the explication of value-semantic foundations of a democratic political control and effective democratic political competition. The application of the results is possible providing theoretical and methodological models of procedural democracy in accordance with historical features of the Russian political process. The main conclusions are the following: the effectiveness of democratic governance is higher if more successful is the society's willingness to consistently use competitive mechanisms of forming government authorities; political competition is only a means for generating power, its aggravation is justified only by improving the quality of government and political governance.