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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.2" xml:lang="ru" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="issn">2408-932X</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title>Research Result. Social Studies and Humanities</journal-title></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="epub">2408-932X</issn></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">DOI: 10.18413/2408-932X-2026-12-3-0-3</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">4318</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>RESEARCHES</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>&lt;strong&gt;The processual dimension of structural realism in the contemporary theory of truth&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;nbsp;</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>&lt;strong&gt;The processual dimension of structural realism in the contemporary theory of truth&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;nbsp;</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author"><name-alternatives><name xml:lang="ru"><surname>Klyusov</surname><given-names>Ilya A.</given-names></name><name xml:lang="en"><surname>Klyusov</surname><given-names>Ilya A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><email>infernushko@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1" /></contrib></contrib-group><aff id="aff1"><institution>Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University</institution></aff><pub-date pub-type="epub"><year>2026</year></pub-date><volume>12</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>0</fpage><lpage>0</lpage><abstract xml:lang="ru"><p>The aim of the study is to show how structural realism can be supplemented with a processual model of the cognitive act that describes truth not as a static correspondence with reality but as a stable dynamics of relations. The article successively examines the limitations of the classical theories of truth, the intermediate position of structural realism and the underdevelopment of its processual dimension; as a clarifying instrument a model of the cognitive act as a cycle of six functional phases is proposed. The scientific novelty lies in linking the notion of truth, for the first time, with the processual stability of structural relations reproduced across a sequence of cognitive acts rather than with the correspondence of a single proposition or the internal coherence of a system of statements. As a result, it was established that the proposed model incorporates objectivity and context dependence, while also allowing for the mutability of truth. It distinguishes itself from coherence theory by relying on an external influx of stimuli. The resulting position can be characterised as processual structural realism, in which the real objects of knowledge are stable, dynamic structures of relations.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The aim of the study is to show how structural realism can be supplemented with a processual model of the cognitive act that describes truth not as a static correspondence with reality but as a stable dynamics of relations. The article successively examines the limitations of the classical theories of truth, the intermediate position of structural realism and the underdevelopment of its processual dimension; as a clarifying instrument a model of the cognitive act as a cycle of six functional phases is proposed. The scientific novelty lies in linking the notion of truth, for the first time, with the processual stability of structural relations reproduced across a sequence of cognitive acts rather than with the correspondence of a single proposition or the internal coherence of a system of statements. As a result, it was established that the proposed model incorporates objectivity and context dependence, while also allowing for the mutability of truth. It distinguishes itself from coherence theory by relying on an external influx of stimuli. The resulting position can be characterised as processual structural realism, in which the real objects of knowledge are stable, dynamic structures of relations.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>structural realism</kwd><kwd>theory of truth</kwd><kwd>processual ontology</kwd><kwd>cognitive act</kwd><kwd>objectivity</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>structural realism</kwd><kwd>theory of truth</kwd><kwd>processual ontology</kwd><kwd>cognitive act</kwd><kwd>objectivity</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>Список литературы</title><ref id="B1"><mixed-citation>Audi,&amp;nbsp;R. (2011), Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed., Routledge, New York.</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="B2"><mixed-citation>Bradley, F. H. (1916), Appearance and reality: a metaphysical essay, G.&amp;nbsp;Allen, London.</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="B3"><mixed-citation>Chakravartty,&amp;nbsp;A. 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