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DOI: 10.18413/2408-932X-2025-11-4-0-1

Reduction as a Phenomenological and General Scientific Principle

The article examines the principles and foundations of phenomenology, as well as its scientific methodology, on the basis of the central concepts of transcendental phenomenology, epoché and reduction. Despite Husserl's view that reduction was 'the very essence' of phenomenology, these concepts did not become unifying ideas within the phenomenological community of the early twentieth century – in fact, they could not. The reasons for this well-known fact are identified and analyzed. The main reasons can be summarized as follows: (1) the very synonymy of the two terms used to designate a single method proves unfavorable for the dissemination of phenomenological ideas, given that “reduction” functions as the more general, “framework” concept; (2) each of the terms has its own rich history which, first, comes into conflict with the desire to interpret these concepts exclusively in the spirit of transcendental phenomenology and serves as a source of constant confusion in their interpretation; second, both notions contain an internal tension between the restriction they call for and the universality of the general theory of science they are meant to serve. A more detailed history of the concepts of epoché and reduction is provided, with references to the ideas of Cicero, René Descartes, and Nicholas of Cusa, as well as to previously overlooked scholarly publications of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

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